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Chapter I - INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this paper will be to examine the role of a
typical Civil Engineer Corps Naval Officer in the organizational
settings in which he is placed by virtue of official and legiti-
mate orders; and through such examination derive concepts, the
application of which will promote greater managerial effective-
ness. Hopefully this paper will attempt to combine substantial
practical experience in the Naval Service with studies in Organi-
zation Behavior at the Sloan School of Industrial Management of
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
To understand the essence of the managerial circumstances
of a Civil Engineer Corps Officer (hereafter called CECO) it is
first necessary to examine the typical bacKground of such an
individual. Basically his education is of a technical nature
with little emphasis on the arts and even less on behavioral
sciences. His management development program is founded prin-
cipally on job rotation with some opportunity for formal up-
dating principally at technical levels and some leadership
training of the stereotyped lecture variety. The CECO is funda-
mentally oriented to the classical principle that structure is
the essential element for control of organizations and his re-
medial actions to correct perceived organizational difficulties
are to change structure. He would also use technological change
and tighter controls to help alleviate organization problems.
Also essential to the understanding of the managerial cir-
cumstances of a CECO is the setting or environment in which he
is placed. The most basic issue in this environment is its
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transient nature. Assignment to major sub-parts or units of the
organization - say a Naval Air Station - is for a Limited period
of time of about two to three years duration. The on-going unit
is almost totally composed of Civil Service employees with only
a scattering of military enlisted personnel. In the authority
structure the CECO is many time placed at the head of a functional
group; i.e. the Public Works Officer, the Shops Engineer, the
Project Management Officer, the Housing Officer, etc. Along with
the transient issue herein lies another and possibly equally im-
portant issue, namely: the superposition of a CECO on the rela-
tively stable, hierarchy type of organization of Civil Servants.
From the typical CECO being placed in the environment as de-
scribed there exists a large potential for conflict based largely
on the assumptions and perceptions of the CECO on one hand and
the body of Civil Servants on the other. For example, the CECO
assumes that most Civil Servants require intense motivation and
he thereby relies on control devices for stimulation. He also
assumes that power, communication, and work all follow the organi-
zation authoritative structure and he therefore attempts reorgani-
zation to correct problems in these dimensions. On the other
hand, the Civil Servant sees the CECO as a transient with little
concern for long range tasks or problems. He perceives each CECO
as another "new broom" theorist and grits his teeth for the in-
evitable reorganization. He accepts the contracted legitimate
authority, but insures that the power, work, and communication
follow different channels.
In this sort of frustrating setting the CECO and Civil
Servant struggle to get the job done - sometimes reasonably

effectively and sometimes not effectively at all. However, one
thing is fairly evident, namely: there is not a great deal of
growth on the part of either, and the organizational health does
not improve to any great degree; nor does the organization be-
come adaptive to the external environment or internalize the
techniques to which it has been exposed.
.
It appears evident that here, as in most things, there is
substantial room for improvement. It would further appear that
certain c ircumstances of the situation must, at least for the
moment, remain as "givens" . I refer principally to the transient
nature of assignments and the hierarchy structure of Civil Ser-
vice. How then can the situation be improved to allow greater
managerial effectiveness by the CECO? It appears that the answer
lies in the attitudes and human behavioral knowledge possessed by
the CECO himself.
Of prime importance is unquestionably the resolution for the
CECO of just where the power really is in his organization; of
just how the job gets done; of where the communication channels
really are. In summary on this point the CECO must have know-
ledge of and understand the informal, dynamic, overlapping nature
of his organization in order to understand the system which is
really at work.
Equally important for the CECO is for him to understand and
capitalize on the true nature of his role - that of a change agent
or consultant who will only have a transient relationship with
the organization and who must, therefore, establish that rela-
tionship, correctly diagnose the problems which arise, help the
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organization system to establish methods for solving those prob-
lems, and terminate the relationship.
It appears then that as a change project we must alter the
relationship and role of the CECO to the organization from one
in which he perceives his legitimate authority as a source of
power, and further perceives his formal organization structure
as highly instrumental, to a relationship where his role is more
that of a consultant to diagnose the system's problems and pro-
vide help in learning problem solving techniques.
Before proceeding with the organization of this thesis which
will conclude this first chapter, I think it necessary to state
certain precautions to be observed in reading further into this
type of literature. Possibly the best approach to the problem is
to state my own personal initial reactions to behavioral science
readings, and to state further my observations of tens of in-
dividuals as they were initiated to course material in this field.
(These persons range in age from 21 to 50 with a typical cross-
section including full and part time students and executives
from industry.) To sum up my experience and observations I con-
clude that the neopbyte in the behavioral sciences usually has
one of the following initial reactions to his exposure:
1. The course material is not consistent with the real
world human behavior as perceived by me.
2. There are no well defined solutions that I can apply
to people's problems, so the behavioral sciences have
limited value.
3. The management of human beings is an art not a science
and must therefore be learned by experience.
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4. What is being presented here about me as a member of
management is very threatening (and therefore wrong)
,
so I will reject it.
It appears that as study continues most persons exposed to
the behavioral sciences will vacillate from the initial reaction
to all of the four reactions mentioned above. As study becomes
more intense the fallacy of the reactions becomes obvious and
learning begins. Hopefully the early knowledge of the existence
of these fallacies will promote greater understanding of this
thesis.
The organization of this paper will be as follows: Chapter
I has attempted to establish the boundaries of the subject and to
provide general background material. Chapter II will deal with
theory about individuals in order to help understanding and have
insight into ourselves as well as others. Chapter III will
attempt to explore management styles and organization systems,
for it is in this setting that human interaction and its conse-
quences take place. Chapter IV is a logical stepping stone
toward the conclusion of this paper as it portrays some vital
concepts of how to grow a manager, or equally applicable in our
case, a CECO. Chapter V attempts to apply the principles about
individuals, organizations, and management development to help
form the basis for a new relationship for the CECO and the organi
zation in which he is placed.
This paper hopefully has a theme which is stated as its
title. Naturally the body of theory presented here is limited
and is in support of that theme. It is for the most part

substantiated by empirical data collected in laboratory experi-
ments, field experiments, or both. If intuition creeps in now
and again it is hoped that its presence will stimulate further
study on the part of the reader, which is, of course, another
fundamental purpose of this thesis.
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Chapter II - SOME THEORY ABOUT INDIVIDUALS
When one begins to look at individuals and why they behave
as they do, there seems to be a tendency to fall into one of two
camps: the Freudian camp or the McClelland camp. (McClelland
is a member of the Harvard faculty who has been a leader in
motive-achievement.) Basically these camps focus on the follow-
ing concepts:
' Freudian - Individual behavior is a result of childhood ex-
perience, and only by an understanding of those ex-
periences can an adult adjust his present behavior.
Essentially the idea is that early childhood is
governed by impulses (physical and aggressive) . How
those impulses are treated in childhood (say by the
parents) determines how the child will behave in later
years. Individual psychiatric help provides the tradi-
tional way for giving the adult the insight into his
childhood which he needs to change his present be-
havior.
McClelland - Individual behavior, however caused, can be
changed by constant reinforcement with symbols (ideas);
i.e., if the person wants to change and is willing to
be exposed to the symbols he will change his behavior
as a result of the complete and continuous bombardment
with ideas. Here the methods of group therapy, group




Now the good thing about these two theories is that they are
not necessarily incompatable, but each does have its trademark.
The Freudian is distinguished by Determinism ("Things are the way
they are; I can't do too much about them; I'm not responsible for
my behavior") . The McClelland ideas are distinguished by Free
Will ("I can do something about my life"). On the McClelland side
there are two subtheories about how and why people behave. The
first is the Interpersonal which makes communication and under-
standing with one' s fellow man of prime importance. A main ex-
ponent of this theory is George Goffman who says essentially that
our lives are rituals of face work to improve our relationships
with people. The second theory is the Existential which says in
effect that self-understanding and self-actualization (the full
realization of our potential) are the main goals in life and our
behavior is governed accordingly. Carl Rogers is one of the
leaders of the Existentialists. Again these latter two sub-
theories on the Free Will side are not necessarily incompatable,
but rather they are bound together by the concept that some-
thing can be done in the here and now towards pergonal growth and
development of individuals and society.
With the above brief statement of the body of theory avail-
able, where shall we dwell to promote fulfillment and realization
for the CECO who might read these lines? On which theory shall
we rely? Certainly the McClelland or Free Will ideas appear to
offer the greatest possibility for individual improvement of
large bodies of people, including groups and organizations, and
so they have become (as they shall be in this paper) the basis
for the new approach to understanding human behavior.
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It should be obvious by now that there is an essential in-
gredient in the McClelland theory upon which all improvement is
based, including the improvement of a CECO. That ingredient is,
of course, a desire on the part of an individual to want to im-
prove; and to improve is to change; and therefore a desire to
change is necessary if the balance of this paper is to serve its
intended purpose.
People resist change and therefore resist their own and their
organization's improvement. Why? Herbert Goodwin, industrial
consultant and MIT professor, says people only resist BEING
changed. What is the difference between resisting change and re-
sisting being changed? Let us see an example which has been ob-
served by me in classroom and industrial settings several times.
The problem: on 9 equally spaced dots placed in a square draw
4 connected straight lines without lifting your pencil.
(Test yourself here if you would like.)
Now this problem is impossible to solve if you stay within the
square. The secret is to change the conception of the figure to
something other than a square like:
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What do we learn from this little problem? First, most people,
initially at least, do not think outside of established patterns;
they do resist change. Second, if left to themselves many people
eventually solve this problem and are perfectly happy with their
solution. They will change if they think of the solution. Third,
some people need hints to solve the problem and if the hints are
given in a helpful way on more or less a collaboration basis (as
opposed to an authoritative basis) the subjects are happy with the
solution. Fourth, for those people who do not solve the problem
and are told the solution, it becomes an object of resistance.
They usually argue that the word square in the problem statement
precludes the solution, or that the problem statement did not
allow for going outside the square. Weak arguements to be sure,
but none-the-less indications that people do resist BEING changed.
How does one unfreeze (Schein's concept of unfreezing, changing,
and refreezing) resistance to change? The answer seems to be a
collaborative, partipative, helpful setting where the individual
sees and realizes the need for change. As an aside here most or-
ganization programs (civilian and military) usually neglect the
unfreezing phase of change and are therefore doomed to mammoth
resistance in the form of apathy, negligence, passivity, or out-
right sabotage.
McClelland 1 s theory implies a desire for change which we
have just discussed. His theory also implies motive or need. It
is said that man is a wanting animal, that his wants or needs are
the motives for his behavior. If this is so, and there is good
evidence to show it is, then if we know what man's needs are we
can better predict his behavior. But what are his needs, and
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which ones are operating at a particular time? Maslow attempts to
offer an answer with his theory of need hierarchy. In summary
this theory places needs in a spectrum from low order to high
order as follows: physical (hunger, thirst, sex, aggression),
safety, sociability, status, and self-actualization. From this
hierarchy man starts with the lowest order need not fulfilled and
emits behavior to satisfy that need. When the need is satisfied,
it is no longer a motivator (a satiated man no longer seeks food)
and man moves to the next higher order need and emits behavior
consistent with satisfying it, and so forth. From a practical
standpoint Maslow admits that there is not a clear cut line of
demarcation between needs and that more than one order of needs
may be operating at once. So, for example, with the need for
sociability partly satisfied, man may actually begin to feel a
need for status and exhibit behavior for both.
Because the implications of Maslow* s theory are so great for
the Navy and industry, I endeavored to check its validity by de-
signing an analysis of panel survey data collected by Douglas Hall,
et al_. The data basically measured changes in various need levels
over a five year period of 49 executives from industry. My design
statistically analyzed low and high need changes. My hypothesis
was Maslow' s theory. As postulated, a preponderance of high order
need increases was accompanied by a reduction in low order needs.
What then are the implications here? Most important, I be-
lieve, is the fact that when an individual is making a living wage
in reasonably healthy and safe surroundings and jobs are relatively
plentiful so that he feels reasonably secure, you will not motivate
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him much by offering him a little more money, or by painting the
employees lunch room,' or by offering him a retirement plan. In
other words while your employees are looking to satisfy their
needs for sociability, status, or self-achievement you would be
trying to fill needs that are already satsified, and your reac-
tion is to wonder why the employees are not motivated. At this
point a question is always raised as to why employees are seemingly
always asking for higher pay, cleaner lunch rooms, and retirement
plans. The answer lies in the second part of Maslow's theory
which postulates that when higher order needs are thwarted, the
individual reverts to lower order needs in frustration. Again
to paraphrase, when the climate of an organization thwarts soci-
ability (the boss hates water cooler get-togethers or people are
strung out on a mass production assembly line) or the ability to
achieve status or achievement, the result may be harassment tactics
at the bargaining table with employees demanding seemingly ful-
filled needs; and, unfortunately, relenting to these demands only
leading to further similar demands with no increase in motivation.
At this point it would appear that we must investigate money
as a motivator. Certainly in the "good old days" when the buying
power of wages was relatively low and a little extra money repre-
sented the difference between meat or no meat meals for the
family, money was a good motivator. In other words it represented
for many people a way to satisfy a very low order need - hunger.
Today in most of our thriving industrial communities money still
appears as a highly sought after prize. Why, if for the most
part hunger has been satisfied? One answer has already been
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offered, namely, reverting to low order needs in frustration.
Another seems to be that money can also satisfy the need for
status, a relatively high order need, which is probably active in
most industrial settings today and may not be satisfied on the job
itself. Money can buy a second car, a dishwasher, a swimming pool
or other status symbols; or it can just make individuals feel good
to know they make a little more than the next fellow. Particularly
applicable here is the reason why until recently the government has
successfully underpaid its military officer corps and yet retained
good personnel. In effect status, prestige, and self -achievement
were offered by high level decision making billets, relative
autonomy, large quarters, chauffeured vehicles, house boys, the
uniform, and so forth. Today there appears to be reduction in
all these status and achievement symbols and so "comparable
salaries" may be the modern answer to satisfy high order needs
for military officers.
One final thought appears appropriate in this chapter on
individuals before we embark on groups and organizations in the
next chapter. It would seem that most adults (particularly males)
are constantly rebelling against the authority figure of their
fathers and are therefore constantly striving for independence.
It has also been shown empirically that individuals are more per-
manently influenced by their peers than by their superiors (father
figures)
. It is evident that a serious conflict thereby exists in
industry and the military where, for the most part, dependence and
authority are stressed. This s-erious conflict may account for
much of the unexplained behavior prevalent in the working environ-
ment today. The answer to the dilemma may lie in a realization by
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superiors that interdependence up and down is the necessary rela-
tionship which exists when tasks are accomplished successfully,
and membership as well as leadership is required of any superior
in a task-oriented group.
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Chapter III - SOME THEORY ABOUT STYLES OF MANAGEMENT
AND ORGANIZATIONAL SYSTEMS
(Note: A great portion of the ideas in this chapter are taken
from the lectures and writings of the late Douglas McGregor,
former president of Antioch College and MIT professor, and former
head of the Organizational Studies Group at the Sloan School of
Management, MIT.)
A scientist or engineer takes the laws of nature and attempts
to adapt to them. For example, the fact that water naturally
flows downhill is used as a great asset in countless ways; fur-
thermore, when it is desired that water flow uphill there are
again adaptations of nature which will cause this. Note that the
scientist or engineer does not ignore the natural propreties of
gravity or water or forever damn Mother Nature for casting things
the way they are, but rather he selectively adapts to them for all
to benefit. Now take that same scientist or engineer and put him
in a situation where his problem is people and diabolically his
approach may be entirely different. In the first place he will
not know nearly as much about people as he does about water, and
what he does know he will be likely to have found by "experience"
rather than by precise measurement. For the most part, he will
be operating with considerably less knowledge about people than he
would dare to about water if, say, he were investigating a hydro
plant or a pump. Although he tolerates Mother Nature completely
for physical phenomena, he is usually a lot less forgiving where
people's actions are concerned, tending to blame them directly for
their misdeeds.
McGregor attempts to explain this apparent breakdown in
method when dealing with human problems by explaining that most

-19
people, including managers and CECO' s, operate with an inherited
and traditional set of assumptions about people which are the
result of unskilled observation about the nature of man. He
calls these erroneous set of assumptions the assumptions of a
theory X style of human relations. In summary they are as
follows:
1. The average person has an inherent dislike for work
and will avoid it if he can.
2. Most people must be coerced, controlled, directed, or
threatened to get them to put forth adequate effort
toward achievement.
3. The average person prefers to be directed, wishes to
avoid responsibility, has little ambition, and wants
security above all.
But maybe McGregor is wrong. After all we do see people
act just as the assumptions describe. Did the theory X style of
relations become paramount because people really are that way?
There is good evidence to believe that this is not the case;
rather, people exhibit the theory X behavior only because group
leaders and organization managers treat them in a way which pro-
motes such behavior. The evidence, as mentioned above, is mount-
ing. Experiments (equivalent in method and value to controlled
scientific experiments) are being conducted daily in organization
and group behavior, and the significant fact appears to be that
when a theory X style of management is removed from the setting,




While we are talking about theory X, we should investigate
what some of the characteristics are of this theory in organiza-
tions such as industry and the Navy. First of all, we must realize
that a theory X style of management grew up from the days when
low order needs (Maslow again) were operating in most factories
and organizations throughout the world; and because people were
hungry it apparently worked quite well. It is certainly an easy
line to take and if it works of course it will be continuously
used. I say it is an easy line because it is based on the tradi-
tional hierarchy structure of the church and the military;
if the man below you in the organization does not do what he is
told you excommunicate him, shoot him, or have other forms of
serious punishment available. It is easy to see why theory X
also worked so well in factories in the early 1900' s, for here
authority and power were matched at every level; if authority
spoke there was power to enforce it.
Another characteristic of theory X is the incentive system.
This basically operates on the assumption that people will do
more for money. But let us really see what happens in a piece-
work incentive system. The boys in the machine shop are slow
on lathe work so management offers a piece rate. Since the boys
in the shop have social needs they do not want to lose the friend-
ship ?f their co-workers by being rate busters, so they get to-
gether and design a technique which will increase the capacity 20
per cent. However, they hide the technique from management and
take turns sharing the increased returns. In the meantime the
foreman of the shop (who does not share in piecework) complains
that the men are outdrawing him and the punch press operators
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also want a piece rate for their work. The union backs this de-
mand. Meanwhile, management, attempting to gain some sort of
equilibrium, decides to adjust the lathe piece rate (or eliminate
it) and the lathe workers strike. But they are not worried about
going back to work because the extra money they have made in the
lucrative piece rate racket is enough for some of them to put a
down payment on some lathes; thus, they now have a moonlighting
shop where they can compete with the daytime boss on the same
parts, but their production is up 50%.
The above description is not exaggerated. 'Many similar
situations are taking place in industry and civil service now.
It is just such situations which prompted Leo Moore, consultant
and MIT professor, to describe some management as, "A series of
morning meetings to clear up the mess made yesterday in order to
get on with the afternoon meetings to make the mess for to-
morrow." My own experience in a factory that I visited regularly
on a student-consulting basis bears out the fact that circum-
stances like those described above do occur, and further, how
difficult it is to change management's assumptions. In an
almost identical case i was asked what management should have
done in the first place. My answer was involvement; to involve
the lathe workers in a design for improving production by merely
asking them to do so. The assistant production superintendent
cut me off quickly. He said, -'We've got involvement I We tell
them to do something and they're involved doing it."
Many adjustments have been made to theory X by management to
try to ward off some of the obvious bad effects it produces, but
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these adjustments have been made without the accompanying changes
in basic theory X assumptions about people. Consequently, most
of these adjustments have been frustrating, at the very least.
One such adjustment was the advent of soft management after World
War II. This era was characterized by human relations training
for supervisors, bigger and better company picnics, employee
fringe benefit orograms, and so forth. Most soft management
techniques failed, possibly because they were perceived by em-
ployees as manipulative neasures without the benefit of a new
theory about people and their higher order needs. But their
failure is most severely felt today in the association made by
management will all forms of organizational improvement. The
words of hundreds of managers are still ringing down the halls of
industry, "Look at all we gave them and all we got was more
strikes, grievances, slowdowns, and demands at the bargaining
table."
Possibly one of the greatest disappointments for management
comes in an era of decentralization. People who criticize the
criticism of theory X are quick to point out that many times in
decentralization when responsibility is delegated to subordinates
they fail. The reasons given are that they were in fact indolent,
or they did not in fact want the responsibility, just as the
theory X assumptions say. But let us see how decentralization
and delegation are actually carried out. Immediately after
establishing a new department, factory, or field office, the very
next step is the imposition of whole and elaborate series of
controls, "Just so we know how you're doing". The basic mis-
trust is immediately evident, but what is worse the newly
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decentralized facility immediately begins defensive techniques
for beating the system. A great part of their resources are put
into making themselves look good instead of determining what is
best for the company. In industry the J. I. C. file is common-
place; that is Just In Case someone asks. "Give the boss what he
wants to hear" is an over-used doctrine. And again the predomi-
nant reason for the failures in decentralization (which in itself
has great merit) is the basic assumption that people are lazy,
they must be stimulated, and they do not really want respons-
ibility; elaborate controls are necessary to keep them in line.
If theory X assumptions are wrong about people, what are
the right assumptions? McGregor offers the following theory Y
assumptions:
1. Physical and- mental work are as natural as play or rest.
Work can be a source of satisfaction and will be volun-
tarily performed, or it can be a source of punishment
and avoided if possible.
2. Man will exercise self-control and self-direction in the
service of organizational objectives to which he is com-
mitted.
3. Commitment to objectives is a function of the rewards
associated with their achievement. The most significant
of such rewards (satisfaction of ego and self-actualiza-
tion) can be direct products of effort directed toward
organization objectives.




5. The capacity to exercise a high degree of ingenuity and
creativity toward the solution of organization prob-
lems is widely distributed among the population.
6. The intellectual potential of the average person in in-
dustrial life today is being only partially utilized.
Will people respond consistently with the theory Y assump-
tions if they are used in organizational settings? Again the
field and laboratory experiments being conducted indicate they
will, and if we believe Maslow we can see why; in today's times
low order needs are in most cases satisfied and the high order
needs are operating. Theory Y with its opportunities for self-
actualization in the form of true responsibility, creativity,
ingenuity, and achievement meets the high order needs of people.
For the same reasons theory X will not work, and further it will
not work because authority and power no longer operate together
at all levels. Expanded job opportunities, unions, the Civil
Service Commission and political influence all operate to remove
some or all of the power from certain positions of authority so
that the enforcement power of old just is not there.
To summarize theory Y one might say that if affords the
possibility of integrating human and organization goals so that
both can be satisfied simultaneously. It provides an environment
which promotes cooperation instead of competition. It promotes
growth and development of people and organizations and thereby
makes them evermore flexible to meet the rapidly changing tech-
nology we face. It provides an organization value system which
rewards participation and participative management. And lastly,
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it creates a climate in which a man can give to his organization
a fuller measure of his potential.
One final word on what theory Y is not . It is not an ab-
dication of authority and responsibility so that everyone is
now in your act and running your program. In fact it is a much
harder line to follow than theory X because it places the respon-
sibility for failure squarely on management's shoulders rather




Chapter IV - SOME THOUGHTS ON MANAGEMENT DEVELOPMENT
As we have seen in the previous chapter the traditional
style of theory X management is one in which the boss, superior,
or manager attempts to control the human resources available to
him; on the other hand, the theory Y style attempts to create a
climate or environment which will release the full potential of
people. With the data seemingly indicating that the latter style
will produce better results in most working environments, and
with the certain knowledge that theory Y is far better geared to
keep pace with a rapidly changing technology, let us proceed to
investigate just how it is possible to grow theory Y managers.
It is hoped that for the CECO this chapter and the one that
follows will present some new and original solutions to our ever
present challenge to be better managers capable of complete flexi-
bility ready for our modern times.
There is an old saying that managers are born and not made.
The acceptance of such an idea would preclude any further work in
management development in favor of some sort of controlled mating
of presidents of large companies with career girls. In fact
there is substantial evidence to indicate that there are great
possibilities for growing managers, and to support this idea we
shall again rely on the McClelland school which is in effect say-
ing that a desire for growth accompanied by sufficient reinforce-
ment for new attitudinal concepts can produce change.
We begin our outlook on management development with Schein's
thoughts concerning the fact that to improve a man's management
capability requires above all an attitude change on his part.
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Most management development today is concerned with skills and
knowledge; that is, computer programming, sales, marketing,
accounting, production, controls and technical improvement.
Without attempting to minimize the importance of most of these
skills they are being stressed in colleges, universities and
training programs at the expense of material which would provide
attitudinal changes in managers; changed assumptions about the
true nature of man, if you will.
If we are not stressing the right kinds of material in our
institutions of higher learning and training courses, what would
be better? To find out let us take a look at how an engineer is
trained. Beginning with his early school years and up through
about his second year of college he is given ample study in the
pure sciences of mathematics, physics, chemistry, electricity,
and so forth. At about his third year in college his field
begins to narrow toward some specialty and he builds practical
knowledge on a solid theoretical base. Now this is all satis-
factory if he remains an engineer devoted to the technical aspects
of creating things out of concrete and steel. If, however, he
transgresses into the field of engineering management, as many
mature persons do (and all CECO's do), he finds that the practical
application of managing people is based on things learned in the
playground, on the athletic field, in fraternities, or from the
novelist. To make matters worse, particularly for the CECO, the
engineering manager finds that more of his time and energy are
being spent on peoples' problems than on technical ones. And
even at times when he begins to boil down what seems a pure en-
gineering dilemma^ somepl ace in the entanglement is a human problem
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which is the key to the solution. It would appear, therefore,
that just as we would not allow an engineer to miss high school
and college physics, we should not allow an engineering manager
to miss an adequate theoretical basis in social sciences, psy-
chology, and organizational behavior. The point here is that
there is actual social science theory to present and draw upon
and we no longer need wait for managers to be born or rely solely
on some rather indeterminate and non-uniform thing called experi-
ence.
In order to portray something of the magnitude of the prob-
lem in merely overcoming the barrier of complacency (and there-
fore no desire for change, growth, and development in the people
side of the management field), Professor Evan of MIT conducted a
survey of approximately 100 scientists, engineers, and managers
on the subject of obsolescence. To summarize, the scientists
and engineers graded themselves and their contemporaries as
growing more and more obsolete in a rapidly changing technology.
The managers, however, saw themselves as just the opposite -
very much up to date. Strikes, militant unions, slowdowns,
worker apathy, and increased demands just do not bear out the
managers' high regard for themselves.
What is the answer? Put everybody through a six-week course
in social science? Unfortunately, the simple logic of running
people through a course does not produce the attitude and assump-
tion change required to obtain the necessary results. This pro-
cedure was the mistake of the human relations training of the
Fifties, where literally thousands of people were given short and
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long courses of unplanned, poorly timed, unrelated material that
they found "wouldn't work back in the shop"..
Any program of attitude change that would be undertaken for
CECO's must be a well conceived, well planned, unhurried program
that is the product of the best resources in the field today.
Such a program would of course have a long and a short plan. The
long range plan might include such things as:
1. A requirement on engineering and management schools to
afford proper study in the fields of social science
proportionate to the effort expended in solving human
problems on the job.
2. A cross fertilization with other than pure engineering
degrees in the CEC, considering possibly people with
degrees in industrial psychology or sociology. (As an
aside John Wear of UCLA has found non-engineers and non-
scientists to be very much more receptive to new atti-
tudes in management, but also found that with engineers
and scientists, once the barrier is penetrated, they are
much more skilled in applying changed attitudes) .
3. Alter the post-graduate program to include a sufficient
number of participants in Organizational Studies.
As for short range plans, which would begin to show effects within
possibly a year or two, they might include:
1. Establishment of an Organizational Studies Group at
the CEC Officers School, which would not only function
for new officers coming into the Corps, but would serve
as the nucleus for all activity of this type in the
Corps and possibly the Navy as a whole.
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2. Hire a sufficient number of civilian industrial psy-
chologists so that they could be available for consulta-
tion with CECO's at Bureau and field offices similar to
the way transportation, design, and maintenance per-
sonnel are available.
3. Contract with organizational psychologists and con-
sultants to help organize general preventive type pro-
grams, and specifically for trouble spots.
4. Take advantage of the many sensitivity training labora-
tories (such as those sponsored by the National Training
Laboratories) and grid training laboratories. (Blake's
grid labs are designed to provide insight into one's
style of management and provide data as to the effects
such a style has on people.)
5. Provide for a program of training and assignments which
allows the maximum amount of career planning in the
hands of the individual himself under the assumption
that only a person who learns to manage himself can
manage others.
In summary, it is noteworthy that the leaders in industry and
education are today speaking a new language of grid labs, sensi-
tivity training, theories X and Y, interpersonal effectiveness,
participative management, growth climate and so forth. CECO's
have an opportunity to be charter members in this new attitudinal
movement to improve the industrial climate.
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Chapter V - THE NEW RELATIONSHIP
Mr. Davis, the Industrial Relations Officer for the National
Laboratory for Space Technology opens some of his guest lecture
series by stating, "The purpose of management is to NOT demoti-
vate." His point is, as in theory Y, that people are already
motivated to be creative and to self-actualize and that if the
climate is right (or at least not stiffling) they will just as
well meet their needs for these values at work where the benefits
are consistent with the goals of the organization. How the CECO
can NOT demotivate, and in fact how he can better create a cli-
mate or environment which will foster the growth and development
of his organization and his people is the purpose of this chap-
ter. Naturally many of the cues and hints for this improvement
and change have already been stated in previous chapters, and so
here we will merely attempt to put a better handle on the subject
and get it in proper perspective.
Possibly one of the greatest areas of neglect in management
in our hurried world of today is that of the relationship between
people involved in an organization. Because of pressing deadlines
and task-oriented operations, insufficient time is spent on
dealing with such things as feelings, conflicts, anxieties, trust,
and understanding. It is common in conferences today to hear the
phrase, "All right fellas, let's keep feelings out of this thing",
with the result that conflict, anxiety, and distrust all go un-
derground only to plague the protagonists and the organization in
countless and seemingly unrelated ways. It will be noted and
acknowledged that this method of suppressing feelings
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and compromising conflicts usually has short range gains; that
is, some quick, workable solution usually comes out of such
management procedures and thereby deludes everyone into a
state of elation and complacency which tends to perpetuate such
methods. The fly in the ointment, which rarely, if ever, is
traced to its source, is the fact that these same short range
gains were taken at the expense of long range growth of the
individuals involved and at the expense of the long range im-
provement of the organization.
Now the concept of surpressing feelings and conflict go hand
and glove with assumptions that authority is the key to manage-
ment problems, for what the boss is really saying when he keeps
feelings out of a discussion is, "If you two fellas don't settle
your differences, I'll settle them for you." But we have
already seen that power many times does not reside with authority,
and so it is with the communication links, the informal cliques,
and the informal working arrangements; they do not many times
follow the organization's authoritative structure and so the
boss may, in fact, NOT be able to settle the differences as
threatened. To compensate for the fact that suppressing feelings
and conflict is just not working as a sound method to handle or-
ganization problems, the concept of Managing Conflict is intro-
duced. Here feelings are treated as facts and the manager is
conceived as being in a role where he promotes getting conflicts
out on the table where they can be discussed and understood,
where trust can be developed because of openness, and where the
relationship between people can be worked on as problems. In
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effect the manager is now cast in the role where he is a catalyst
to help the organization, which is a living, dynamic system, solve
its owns problems. He aids and fosters the problem solving
techniques of the organization and maintains the proper balance
of work on tasks to work on relationships among people.
To relate the concepts above to the position of a CECO in a
typical Civil Service organization we need only recall our frus-
tration at times when agencies other than CECO's in authority
actually supply the power, communication, and work arrangements
to influence the organization. To dogmatically rely on authority
to manage the organization usually leads to over control or re-
organization with a resultant lessening of influence, and
eventually the negating of any management improvement potential
the CECO brings to the organization. Why is this so? Because
there are certain "givens" which are facts of life that must be
selectively adapted to or run the risk of failure. The fact that
power no longer resides with authority cannot be ignored, despite
the fact that we wish for it to be overlooked. Authority has
its rightful place in certain truly military organizations and it
works in a good old traditions fashion in those settings, but it
is not appropriate in many civil service environments simply
because the power necessary to maintain it just is not there.
This is not to say that authority is never appropriate in Civil
Service. There certainly are times when it is necessary, and
the secret of its use seems to be to use it not only because it
seems necessary, but as a second criterion, when it will work.
This thesis does not propose the abdication of authority, but
it does propose that a CECO, or any manager, have the flexibility
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to work from a position of influence when authority is either not
appropriate or when it will not work; and further to realize that
authority is many times associated with short term gain at the
expense of long range growth and development.
If traditional authority is not effective in many situations
for the CECO and if a style of managing conflict might promote
greater effectiveness for him in the environment of Civil Ser-
vice, then what should his relationship be to the organizations
in which he is placed? Lippit and Watson, the authors of Planned
Change and Richard Beckhart, organizational consultant, might con-
ceive of the CECO as an agent of change. LCDR Stedman, a colleague
of mine in the Sloan School, has speculated that since a CECO
moves from assignment to assignment he has the built-in capability
of being a consultant to each Civil Service organization to which
he is sent. Now up to this point these concepts do not sound
new. After all CECO's have promoted change everywhere they have
been; if putting across new ideas to an organization can be con-
sidered as consulting, then they have done that also. Is that
what Lippit, Watson, Beckhart, and Stedman mean by being a con-
sultant or change agent? Let us examine a synthesis of their
ideas and see.
First, a true consultant (change agent can be used inter-
changably) is more often than not an outsider who attempts to help
the organization system learn to cope with its own problems and
thereby not become dependent on him for the solutions to problems.
The boss or management "consultant" firm who conceives of, let us
say, a reorganization to solve a company problem are not consul-
tants, but in effect problem solvers. Now the difference here is
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that while their solutions may be perfectly good ones, the organi-
zation or the people in it did not learn any new coping or prob-
lem solving techniques. In effect there was no growth or improve-
ment of relationships or technical problem solving abilities.
However, even worse is the result of the adage, "People tend to
support what they create." If the people have their problems
solved for them, it follows that they did not create the solutions
with the result that they regard the solutions with apathy,
passivity, resistance, and, at times, outright sabotage. One can
think of tens of management programs, large and small, which organi-
zations have resisted, not necessarily because the programs were
bad, but because they were imposed.
Second, a true consultant realizes the required phases of
change and he has a planned approach which will probably include
a diagnostic and strategic phase as follows:
1. Diagnostic
(a) Determine the need to change both from the stand-
point of desirability and readiness. Sometimes change
is considered when not desirable, and, at times, change
is required without readiness. Promoting openness in
discussion will many times increase the readiness for
change.
(b) Determine the true nature of the problem. For
example, quality control is often mistaken for the prob-




(c) Determine the appropriate organization system in-
volved. Often a segment of the organization chart is
mistakenly chosen as a functional area to work on rather
than asking, "Who in this whole organization is in this
problem?"
(d) Given many segments of the organization which might
require a particular change, determine the segment nost
vulnerable and chose it for a pilot change program which
other segments can emulate.
(e) Determine own resources and motivation and plan the
strategy accordingly. Many times a consultant's own
resources for influence are underestimated or his own
motivation begins to control his actions. The most
common case of this is where the consultant feels inse-
cure about his position and comes out very authoritative
in order to compensate for his feeling of inadequacy.
2. Strategy
(a) Determine appropriate change objectives; not out
of sight and yet distinct enough to be measurable.
Here target or goal setting rather than evaluation of the
system can be participated in by the organization to the
betterment of all and toward hastening the change pro-
cess
.
(b) Determine the roles each participant (including the
consultant) is to play in the change process.
(c) Determine the leverage points of the system; that is,
what access do you have to whom and what linkage does that
segment have to the other segments?
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(d) Initiate the plan.
And so what is in effect being proposed here is that the
CECO see in the role of a true consultant the opportunity for
flexibility wherein he would possess alternatives other than the
traditional one of authority. If he played the role of consul-
tant, it is possible that by the use of diagnostic skills he could
better help the organization system cope with the correct prob-
lem, thereby promoting its growth and creative potential. Further,
there would be less of a tendency for the organization to become
dependent on him, thereby stiffling its problem solving ability
after his relationship is terminated. Since, as a consultant he
does not impose problem solutions on an organization, the CECO
would probably be accepted more openly the the on-going Civil
Service organization, thereby establishing a healthy relation-
ship earlier, to the betterment of both.
In summary, it is believed that a CECO approaching a new
billet as a true consultant could better apply those desirable
theories of organization behavior presented in this thesis and
thereby increase his managerial effectiveness for the betterment
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